Abstract: Military coups have posed a persistent threat to political stability in Africa, undermining democratization efforts, igniting insurgencies, and leading to years of devastating military governance. Initial cross-national studies found little consistent evidence linking ethnicity to coups, leading recent formal and statistical work on coup risk and coup-proofing to largely ignore ethnic politics. This article, however, argues that in two important contexts of African political development-decolonization and democratization-ethnic politics are critical to understanding the occurrence of coups. Both case study evidence and statistical analysis of original data on African military history and ethnic politics reveals that practices of ethnic manipulation within security institutions have driven coup attempts. When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers.
Given the impact that military coups have on political stability, civil war onset, and democratization, it is important to ask: what causes African militaries to intervene so frequently in the domestic politics of their societies?
To answer this question, I depart from recent statistical and formal modeling works that have come to ignore ethnic politics as an important driver of military coups. Rather, I
ground my theoretical claims in both the ethnic politics literature and the extensive case study literature on African coups that has long suggested the centrality of ethnic dynamics to this form of political violence. These theoretical claims are then evaluated using original data on African military history and original measurements of ethnic manipulation within security institutions.
I argue that when leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers. At the critical juncture of independence, African leaders made important decisions over how they would ensure military loyalty. Where leaders conditioned military recruitment, promotion, and access to patronage on shared identity-despite existing diversity in the colonial officer corps-I argue that they tended to initiate violent cycles of ethnic coups and counter-coups as officers resisted discrimination. I find that such countries experienced coups roughly four times as often as their counterparts in the post-independence period.
I then examine how these historical legacies have impacted democratization efforts in contemporary Africa. Many leaders did successfully build coethnic armies, either with the assistance of departing colonial powers or through a violent process of purges. Democratic elections in a multiethnic society threaten to empower new leaders who no longer ethnically match these existing armies and have strong incentives to dismantle them. When this occurs, the ethnically stacked officer corps fears the loss of their power, privilege, and patronage-and may react by seizing power. I find that when elections empower a new leader ethnically distinct from a previously constructed ethnic army, coup risk increases dramatically: from under 20% to roughly 89%.
This article underscores the necessity of military reform in contemporary Africa. If democracy is to thrive in multiethnic societies, existing ethnic armies must be dismantled and national military institutions diversified. Yet, my work should also emphasize how difficult and dangerous this task will be. Ethnic armies do not stand idly by and allow for their own demise. Reformers should thus anticipate a struggle.
Previous Approaches
In the 1960-70s, the spate of military coups across recently decolonized countries elicited the development of a statistical literature concerned with the structural risk factors underlying coup propensity. Such studies analyzed a wide range of potentially important variables, including the underdevelopment of political institutions, strength of civil society, degree of military professionalization, number of soldiers and their relative pay, economic development and growth rates, commodity dependency, past coup history, and ethnic diversity, among others. Yet, these works generated only two consistently statistically significant findings: that coups tend to occur more frequently in poor countries and where there is a pattern of past military coups (Jackman 1978; Jackman et al. 1986; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Johnson et al. 1984; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Londregan and Poole 1990; Lunde 1991; McGowan and Johnson 1984; O'Kane 1981; Przeworski et al. 1996 ; more recently see Bazzi and Blattman 2011; Belkin and Shofer 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000) .
These studies produced no systematic evidence, however, that ethnic politics matters to the production of military coups, even though many of them were deeply concerned with ethnic dynamics and included ethnic diversity and dominance measures in their regressions.
Rather, they arrived at contradictory results with some finding significant correlations (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Lunde 1991 ) and others no relationship (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Jackman 1978; Jackman et al. 1986 ). This absence of systematic evidence linking ethnic politics to military behavior has led recent statistical and formal work on coups and coup-proofing to neglect ethnicity altogether, even as a control variable (see Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Galtovic and Sanhueza 2012; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2012; Powell and Lasley 2012 ).
Yet, the case study literature has long suggested that ethnic dynamics are critical to understanding evolving military dynamics in many African states. For example, thick descriptions of the Ghanaian, Nigerian, and Sierra Leonean armies suggest that ethnic hostilities within these military institutions played an important role in inciting particular coup attempts (see, respectively, Hutchful 1985; Luckham 1971; Cox 1976) . Based on accounts such as these, medium-N comparative scholars of African politics and ethnicity, such as Samuel Decalo and Donald Horowitz, have claimed that "ethnic coups" are an important and distinct phenomenon worthy of theoretical articulation (Decalo 1990 (Decalo & 1998 Horowitz 1985, 480-492) .
If ethnic dynamics are as integral to African military coups as contextually rich case studies suggest, why then has ethnicity failed to consistently attain significance in crossnational work that stresses generalizability? The answer, I contend, lies in two limitations of the existing statistical literature. First, typical studies of coup risk assume arguably non-homogeneous units of observation (all country-years). In the weakest version of this assumption, the same change in an independent variable generates a constant expected effect across all units. Coups, however, are tactics. Military officers may seize power to achieve diverse political ends, from capturing the reigns of government to protesting a devastating war. Coups as tactics may thus be deployed for systematically different reasons dependent on the larger political context. For example, civil wars can place extreme pressures on civil-military relations. Battlefield losses, lack of supplies, and war fatigue have all contributed to military uprisings-including against France and Portugal's colonial counterinsurgencies in Africa and Mali's underfunded war in the Sahel. When a country is fighting a war, we might therefore expect the adequacy of arms supply to significantly effect coup propensity. This same variable is unlikely, however, to exert an identical effect in the absence of war.
Modeling techniques such as interaction effects can account for this type of unit variation by integrating the observed heterogeneity into the model. This requires, however, that each context first be properly theorized in its own right, revealing how independent variables are likely to behave across contexts. Some recent work has moved in this direction: toward theorizing and testing hypotheses within a particular political context, rather than developing universal models that explain coups across all conceivable contexts (an ambitious task for any tactic). For example, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2012) develop a formal model to explain coups against autocratic regimes while Clark (2007) and Lindberg and Clark (2008) analyze coups against liberal democratic African regimes. These context-specific works, however, have yet to integrate ethnic politics into their models.
A further problem lies in the measurements of ethnicity employed in existing crossnational studies. Broad social measures of ethnic diversity and dominance have increasingly been criticized by the ethnic politics and conflict literatures as "meaningful operationalization[s] of ethnic politics" since they cannot capture the often complex causal pathways between ethnicity and outcomes, including political violence (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 527-536; Lieberman and Singh 2012, 1-2) . Indeed, there is no compelling theoretical story linking such measures to the actions of military officers.
This article seeks to overcome these limitations and contribute to our understanding of how ethnic politics condition military coups and compound the challenges facing liberalizing African states in three important ways. First, I too take a step back from more universal statistical approaches and instead build middle-range theory specific to the contexts of decolonization and, later, democratization. At the same time, I attempt to transcend the limitations of standard case studies by generating theoretical insights that are testable crossnationally, even if constrained by context-specific scope conditions. Through this approach, I bring back the recently neglected centrality of ethnic politics to African civil-military relations and to our understanding of when African militaries are likely to overthrow elected leaders. I leave to future research, however, other vital contexts-such as coup dynamics during civil wars or military responses to social uprisings such as the Arab Spring-as well as the ultimately desirable theoretical integration of diverse contexts into a more universal model. Second, this article also contributes to the commendable effort by scholars of ethnic politics to better theorize causal mechanisms linking ethnicity to outcomes and to develop appropriate measures capturing them. For example, the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset measures the exclusion of ethnic groups from executive power (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009) ; the EVOTE project constructs measures for the ethnic basis of political parties and how they implicitly and explicitly appeal to identity groups (Chandra 2009 ); and Wilkinson is developing a measure of "ethnic balance" in postcolonial military institutions (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 537-545) . In this article, I similarly develop original measures to capture how ethnic groups were incorporated into colonial officer corps, whether post-independence leaders recruited officers on an ethnic basis, whether past leaders had created ethnic armies, and whether a constitutional transfer of executive power also entailed a change in the ethnic identity of leadership.
Finally, I construct an original dataset on African military history and ethnic manipulations within African security institutions. This data was culled from extensive sources including archival documents from Africa, Europe, and the United States, historical newspapers, secondary scholarly accounts, and tertiary reference books and qualitative datasets.
A Theory of Ethnic Coups
I make two related arguments, both grounded in an understanding of ethnic politics and competition, to explain the relative propensity of African militaries to seize state power in the contexts of decolonization and democratization. The first argument analyzes independence as a critical juncture for security institutions and posits the development of coup traps as a function of how early African leaders chose to build military loyalty. In broad strokes, I argue that where leaders chose to condition military recruitment and promotion on shared ethnic ties, despite a diverse colonial officer corps, they tended to set their countries on dan- 
Colonial Military Practices and Decolonization
Military loyalty plays a critical role in regime stability, particularly the loyalty of the officer corps. Rank-and-file soldiers typically do not command others (excepting NCOs).
Thus, they cannot easily organize large-scale resistance and, when they do revolt, rarely accomplish more than a short-term mutiny. On the other hand, officers-including very junior officers and (rarely) NCOs-can use their position in the command hierarchy and ability to issue largely uncontestable orders to move troops and engage in combat, without revealing their anti-government intentions to their subordinates.
1 Officers topple governments. (Newbury 1998, 13) . In August 1960, the Congolese government disintegrated after rank-and-file soldiers revolted against continued Belgian officership, spreading fears of state failure across the continent (Meditz and Merrill 1993) . Facing potential ethnic violence, civil war, and state disintegration, African leaders were hard pressed to find an effective means to tie soldiers to the state.
Colonial military practices provided a ready model of ensuring loyalty through racial and ethnic manipulations. While native soldiers comprised their rank-and-file, colonial armies were officered almost exclusively by white Europeans. This remained the case on the eve of independence and, in many countries, even after the formal transfer of sovereignty. Throughout colonial Africa, race defined who could be trusted to command.
Conceptions of ethnic loyalty also shaped rank-and-file recruitment practices. British martial race doctrine, developed first in India, stipulated that some ethnic groups were naturally more politically reliable and suited to combat and military discipline than others.
Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) and then Governor-General (1912 -1919 of Nigeria, further developed this doctrine in Africa. He proscribed that one ethnic group should dominate the colonial army, provided that that group was both politically reliable and unable to dominate civilian political life (i.e., the local civil service). It was a policy of "making the politically strong militarily weak and the politically weak militarily strong (Ibid, 154) ." Lugard's model was widely emulated. By such logic, the Kamba and Kalenjiin came to dominate the Kenyan battalions of the King's African Rifles, while the Kikuyu were purposely excluded (Parsons 1999, 58) . In Uganda, northerners, and especially the northwestern Acholi and Teso ethnic groups, were targeted for military recruitment (Keegan 1983, 598-600) . Beyond the British, Belgian colonial administrators also established ethnic recruitment quotas based on racialized perceptions of martial prowess (Adekson 1979, 160-161) . Even the French, who initially avoided deterministic group-based evaluations of military fitness, were drawn to such practices over time. Tribes from the sparsely populated forest zones were eventually seen as undesirable soldiers because they lacked a strong martial tradition (Echenberg 1991, 63) . 
The Development of Ethnic Coup Traps
Choosing ethnicity as the foundation for military loyalty was, counterintuitively, dangerous for political stability-despite its very purpose of ensuring such stability. Building a coethnic army often required not just discriminatory recruitment, but the dismissal or marginalization of non-coethnic officers. Leaders employed two primary tactics to build such coethnic security institutions: (1) restructuring the officer corps of the existing army along coethnic lines, or (2) constructing coethnic parallel military institutions, such as presidential guards and militias, and then disarming the regular army. Both present a similar threat to existing out-group officers, motivating many initial coup attempts and leading to cycles of violence wherein ethnic factions within the officer corps attempted to seize power and purge one another from the ranks.
3
Attempting to place a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in the hands of a sole identity group inherently threatens excluded groups. They face both discrimination and declining relative power. Recent research in ethnic politics also suggests that conditioning access to a key state institution on ethnic identity heightens the salience of ethnic divides. By institutionalizing ethnicity and endowing it with imposed importance, governments prime individuals to interpret facts and events in terms of ethnicity. Indeed, the more identity shapes one's life chances and access to resources, the more useful it becomes as a cognitive device for reducing uncertainty. Questionable actions and isolated incidents of violence, that may not be motivated by ethnic differences, are then more likely to be interpreted through an ethnic lens. This, in turn, escalates communal hostilities (Hale 2008, 33-40; Lieberman and Singh 2012, 2-6) . We thus expect soldiers facing ethnic discrimination to feel threatened, primed to interpret events in ethnic terms, and faced with a shrinking window of opportunity in which to reverse their fortunes.
In these circumstances, violent resistance is likely. An initial attempt to restructure the Initial resistance to the construction of an ethnic army, however, would only take the form of a military coup where the colonial state had previously built diversity into the officer corps. Departing colonial powers sometimes colluded with incoming governments to construct an ethnically homogenous army, matching the ethnicity of the nascent leadership, prior to decolonization. This was the case, for example, in both Mauritania (Maure) and Rwanda (Hutu). Here, the existing officers already benefited from a system of ethnic privilege within the military and were unlikely to protest its continuation. Hypothesis 1: Countries whose independence era leaders chose to build ethnic armies despite inheriting a diverse (or unmatched) officer corps will develop coup traps. Leone's new national army entirely in the hands of the British, who continued to control training, recruitment, and promotion (Keegan 1984, 517-18) . 4 Africanization of the officer corps proceeded at a slow, but steady pace and the British recruited from across ethnic groups. In 1964, 26% of officers were Mende, 12% Temne, and 64% were drawn from other, mostly northern groups (Cox 1976, 54) . They failed and Stevens' regime was soon able, through additional purges, to achieve Limba homogeneity of the army and police forces. Stevens also created a paramilitary unit, known as the Internal Security Unit (ISU)-also predominantly Limba-that was used to inflict violence on domestic opponents and eventually grew to be more powerful and better equipped than the regular army (Cox 1976, 106-107; Davies 2000, 352-353; Horowitz 1985, 477-479; Kandeh 1992, 94) .
Sierra Leone and Cameroon
The choice to ethnically homogenize the army thus provoked a series of coups and countercoups which only ceased through the eventual creation of coethnic security institutions, combined with the use of external Guinean troops for added protection. Cameroon-to perceive these ties as evidence of an extreme security threat to the region.
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Rather than compromise with the UPC, French authorities excluded the movement and its political sympathizers, comprised mainly of southerners and particularly the Bamiléké and Bassa ethnic groups, from the civilian government that inherited power upon decolonization (Atangana 2010, 14; Minority Rights Group 2010) .
Instead, the French preferred to work with a more "moderate" Cameroonian government that would shun communism and pledge to maintain strong ties with the French economic community. In 1958, the French High Commissioner installed Ahmadou Ahidjo and his northern Fulani/Peuhl-based political party in power (Atangana 2010, 74) . In the same year, 
Ethnic Armies and Democratization
The ethnic coup traps that developed from decolonization processes could not sustain themselves indefinitely. Some ended when rebels overthrew a military paralyzed by factional infighting. Uganda, for example, experienced a remarkable nine coup attempts during the Idi Amin and second Obote regimes, many of which resisted ethnic manipulations by those leaders (Horowitz 1985, 486-492 militaries from the beginning. Much of Africa was thus left with a legacy of ethnic armies (see also Enloe 1975 Enloe & 1980 N'Diaye 2001) .
This historic tendency to base military loyalty on ethnic foundations is critical to understanding contemporary struggles over African democratization. 8 Democracy and democratization are heavily contested concepts, endowed with a wide range of meanings and expectations across both societies and scholarly works. Yet, as Bratton and van de Walle contend, in the late 1980's and early 1990's, African countries took an "indispensable first step" on the path of democratization by adopting competitive elections to install new leaders (1997, 10) . It is in this sense that I use the term democratization-as a critical juncture in African political development and the beginning of a long and fragile process of liberalization and democratic consolidation.
Hypothesis 2: Where elections or other constitutional transfers of executive power undermine the "ethnic matching" between civil and military authorities, we should witness an increased probability of a coup attempt.
[ Figure 1 
Data Collection and Coding Procedures
To evaluate whether the general historical experiences of African countries support these hypotheses, I compiled existing data on Military coup attempts and coded original cross-national data for the following, theoretically significant independent variables: Prior ethnic violence, Loyalty choice, Ethnically matched officer corps, Ethnic change in leadership transitions, and Prior ethnic stacking. The data was culled from a wide variety of sources including archival documents, 10 newspaper articles, 11 reference books and tertiary qualitative datasets, 12 and secondary scholarly accounts.
Military coup attempts: To construct the dependent variables, I cross-referenced Mc-
Gowan's dataset on African coups (2003) with the Archigos database on political leaders (Goemans et al. 2009 ) and expanded that data to cover the years 1952-1955 and 2002-2012 .
A minimum of two reports citing evidence of actual military violence, military occupation
10 From the British National Archives (Kew), the French Colonial Archives (Aix-en-Provence), the French Military Archives (Vincennes), the U.S. National Archives II (College Park), the National Archives of Senegal (Dakar), and the Kenya National Archives (Nairobi).
11 Principally from Keesings World News Archive, Lexus-Nexus Academic, Proquest Historical Newspapers, and the BBC.
12 Of particular importance were John Keegan's World Armies, the Minorities at Risk Project, the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People, the Library of Congress country studies, and the Encyclopedia of 20th Century African History. Since this situation entails the same theoretical prediction (no rebellion), it is also coded as matched. In all other cases the variable is coded as Ethnically unmatched.
Coding individual identity presents a number of challenges. Individuals can emphasize aspects of their identity in strategic and flexible ways (Posner 2005) . Leaders can also marry outside of their own ethnic group and utilize the identity of their spouses to foster political loyalty (Londregan et al. 1995, 6 ). Nonetheless, leaders usually self-identified-and were identified by their contemporaries-as having a single ethnic identity. And while spousal affiliations could play a role in the political game writ large, those who built coethnic armies chose their own group and usually exclusively so (with some exceptions for traditional ethnic allies or neutrals). Where mixed identity did occur, then if any group dominated the officer corps and that group matched part of the leader's identity, the variable was coded as matched.
Defining when a particular ethnic group dominates the officer corps is difficult. Dominance should imply such a majority that no other group has a realistic chance of successfully seizing power. There is no clear numerical line, however, above which all cases would meet the qualitative standard. Dominance, as defined above, depends on many factors, including how many identity groups have representation in the military and how they are distributed across the branches of military service. I have thus stayed with more qualitative understandings: did credible observers at the time think that the officer corps was dominated by a particular group? Bias in source materials then becomes an important concern. Perhaps observers had a vested interest in portraying colonial military recruitment practices in a certain light-as discriminating against their group or, conversely, in down-playing their group's representation. Such tendencies could introduce significant distortion into the data. Careful attention to sources and their potential biases can alleviate some of this concern. Most countries were coded based on official military intelligence reports from the French and British archives.
When such documents were unavailable, I turned to the accounts of sociologists and historians writing about these militaries in close temporal proximity to decolonization.
Ethnic change (or continuity): For the democratization data, it is important to differentiate between elections and electoral transfers of power. Autocratic regimes routinely hold uncompetitive elections, known as electoral authoritarianism, that merely rubber stamp a longtime leader's hold on power. In order not to confuse autocratic elections with at least partially democratic ones, I thus limit the universe of cases to elections that produced a turnover in executive power as well as other constitutional transfers of power (for example, after the natural death of a leader).
The ethnicity of each leader, before and after the constitutional or electoral transfer of power was then coded at the highest level of ethnic aggregation.
13 If the ethnic identity of the leader prior to the transition was different from that of the leader assuming power, the power transfer was coded as an Ethnic change. Otherwise, it was coded as Ethnic continuity.
In no case was regional identity used as the basis of coding, even though region plays an important role in the politics of many African countries-particularly in Sahelian states such as Benin, Nigeria, and the Sudan where north-south divides are arguably more important than ethnic differences in shaping the struggle for power. While such contextual awareness in coding is desirable, it also increases the risk of fitting theory to the evidence rather than evaluating hypotheses according to the data. For this reason, I follow the stricter coding procedure.
Moreover, excluding regional considerations likely biases the results against the proposed theory. In Africa, the ethnic homelands of powerful groups do not tend to cross important administrative regional divides-which were largely constructed by colonial practices that treated the groups separated by these boundaries differently. Thus, recoding by regional identity would rarely alter a categorization of ethnic continuity into one of ethnic change.
Rather, we would only expect to find the reverse-codings of ethnic change that do not involve a difference in region and thus, when coded by region, would become instances of ethnic continuity. We do not expect to observe coup attempts in such cases where regional identity is highly salient and power transfers between leaders from the same region. Thus, coding by region would eliminate several "false negatives" as cases originally incorrectly
13 Except in Somalia, where codings were based on clans.
predicted to have coups would instead be successfully predicted as stable. Therefore, the more stringent coding rule, which excludes regional identity, biases the results in a downward direction-increasing our confidence in positive findings.
Prior ethnic stacking: This variable was coded 1 if the leader prior to the constitutional transfer of power had stacked the military with his coethnics, and 0 otherwise. Similar concerns over coding identity, defining dominance, and identifying source material bias arose as with the Ethnically unmatched officer corps and Ethnic change variables and were handled in the same manner.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, I test the two primary implications of my theoretical framework using [ Table 1 Many of these power transfers were followed closely by violent military reactions: 33% experienced a coup attempt within four years (41% of electoral transitions). 15 Periodizing the data by decade illustrates an important temporal pattern: as the third wave of democratization swept across Africa in the 1990s, the number of constitutional leadership transitions 14 This standardizes the time frame of analysis in a meaningful way. Changing the period of observation to 15 years or to the total time since independence does not significantly change the results. Some minor exceptions should be noted: first, for countries that lacked military institutions at independence, I calculated the 20 year observation window from the establishment of their first military unit. Second, Liberia and Ethiopia required special consideration. Ethiopia enters the dataset in 1941, the year that Italian occupation forces were expelled during World War II and Haile Selassie restored to the throne. His resumption of power marked a period of great military reform and professionalization-away from Ethiopia's feudal military obligation system and toward modern training academies. It was more difficult to determine a starting point for Liberia because of its unique history. I chose 1960, when a great number of West African countries were decolonized and the threat of colonialism was thoroughly removed.
Descriptive Data
15 Although one might expect military officers to react immediately to perceived threats to their corporate interests, in some contexts it makes more sense for military officers to wait. Coups are highly risky endeavors-the punishment for treason often involves death. And, in the absence of actual restructuring, the relative power of ethnic military factions does not decline. Officers motivated by self-preservation may thus exhaust all other alternatives before attempting a coup. Four years, the length of a typical election cycle, was thus chosen as a reasonable observation window. Approximately 57% of these constitutional power transfers involved a change in the ethnicity of leadership. Table 5 depicts the relationship between ethnic changes in leadership, the tendency of previous leaders to build coethnic armies, and coup attempts. Where leaders had successfully constructed coethnic armies and constitutional processes then brought to power new leaders from different ethnic backgrounds, those ethnic armies reacted by seizing power-75% of the time.
[ Table 2 about here]
Regression Analysis
These cross-national patterns lend preliminary support to the theories developed in this article. They do not, however, control for potentially confounding variables, test alternative explanations, or rigorously estimate uncertainty. I thus turn to regression analysis.
16 Two distinct models are leveraged to further test the hypotheses.
First, I have argued that countries choosing to build ethnic armies despite diverse officer corps' should experience greater relative instability following independence. To test this implication of the theory, I use the total count of military coup attempts in the 20 years
16 All statistical models were run in R using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007) .
following independence. Since the variance-to-mean ratio of this dependent variable (2.7)
suggests over-dispersion, a negative binomial model is employed. The control variables were also carefully selected on the basis of theoretical significance.
Complete descriptions and summary statistics are contained in the online appendix. Based on extant studies, controls were included for relative wealth (Ln GDP/k ), 18 Prior coups, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Ethnic diversity (Roeder, 2001) ). The Ethnic violence variable was also included in the decolonization models to control for any effects that such past violence may have continued to exert on political stability, even though loyalty choices were not determined by it.
It is also reasonable to think that economic shocks, understood as sharp downturns in a country's economic well-being, may increase coup risk. As public support for the incumbent government declines, recessions can create opportunities for many types of violence, including coups (Alesina et al. 1996; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000) . Systematic preindependence economic data was unavailable and thus could not be included in the count model where it would be appropriate. For the democratization models, an Economic shock variable was coded 1 if, in any year during the four year period following the leadership transition, the country experienced a negative growth rate of 1% or more, and 0 otherwise. 19 3%, 5%, and 10% economic shock variables were also coded in a parallel fashion to capture increasing levels of crisis severity. An alternative measure using the country's lowest (i.e., worst) current account balance (CAB) as a percentage of GDP was also constructed. Large current account balance deficits tend to cause (or at least reflect) greater financial struggles as well as a government's inability to pay its employees-including the military.
Clark (2007) and Lindberg and Clark (2008) have argued that the legitimacy accrued through processes of political liberalization may serve to inoculate regimes against military overthrow. This insight is drawn from liberal democratic theory, which posits that democratic regimes enjoy legitimacy in both the eyes of the general population and amongst important elites such as military actors. Thus, as a state travels from authoritarianism through the various stages of democratic transition and liberalization towards consolidated democracy, its legitimacy should correspondingly grow, decreasing its susceptibility to military overthrow (Lindberg and Clark 2008, 89) . Trajectories of increasing liberalization should thus correlate to reduced coup risk while trajectories towards authoritarian regression may have the opposite effect.
Measuring legitimacy, however, is inherently difficult as legitimacy is at once a subjective and contextually dependent phenomenon (Clark 2007, 143) . Survey data, such as that provided by Afrobarometer, may ultimately provide the best measure but is currently unavailable across enough countries and years to systematically measure trajectories of legit- ternative mechanism: that revenues from the sale of natural resources increase the potential rewards of state control, thereby encouraging attempts to seize power (Collier and Hoeffler 2005, 4-5; Humphreys 2005, 519) . We thus have two mechanisms, pulling in opposite directions. For the count model, I include a dummy variable, Mineral exporter, for whether oil, gas, or other minerals constituted a principal export at independence (Mitchell 2003; United Nations 1965) . For the logit models on democratization, I include Humphreys' variable for
Oil production-the average daily per capita barrel production for the year of the transition. 
Results
The regression analysis confirms the findings of the descriptive statistics. Countries whose leaders chose to build ethnic armies despite facing an existing, diverse officer corps tended to face substantially more coups than their counterparts. In the count model, the Ethnic & Unmatched category is positive and statistically significant (see Table 3 ). Considering that coups are relatively rare events, the substantive effect is quite important. Attempting to construct an ethnic army despite existing diversity in the officer corps is predicted to result in four times as many coups (see Figure 2 ).
[ Table 3 about here]
[ Figure 2 about here] Likewise, the multivariate results for the democratization data confirm the descriptive findings. Table 4 presents the regression results for both the full set of constitutional power transfers as well as the elections only data. While both the Ethnic continuity & stacking and Ethnic change & stacking categories are significantly associated with increased coup risk across models, the magnitude of the effect is comparatively small: 12-25% risk compared to the 0% risk of the baseline category (ethnic continuity and prior inclusive army). The Ethnic change & stacking category, on the other hand, has a drastically higher predicted coup risk:
66% for all constitutional power transitions and 89% when elections are involved, all else being equal (see Figure 3) . [ Table 4 about here]
[ Figure 3 about here]
Robustness Checks
Due to substantial variation in the types of constitutional changes in leadership, unit heterogeneity may undermine the comparability of these observations. A separate analysis was thus conducted on the most homogeneous subset of electoral transitions-those regularly scheduled or occurring through planned democratization efforts (n=35). Both the Ethnic change & stacking category and the Economic shock variable retained their statistical significance and direction and showed a slight increase in magnitude (for full results, see the online appendix).
Further robustness checks were conducted by substituting alternative measures for several of the control variables as well as by introducing further controls for other potentially important factors. The online appendix contains descriptions of each of these additional variables as well as the full statistical results. Across all models, the competing ethnic fractionalization measures of Alesina et al. (2003) , Fearon (2003(a) ), and Posner (2004) were substituted for ELF. Two measures for ethnic dominance were also constructed from Fearon's data: percent share of the largest group in the total population and whether any group constituted more than 50% of the population. Indicator variables were included for ongoing civil wars, which could place independent strains on civil-military relations, as well as for Herbst's measurement of difficult geography.
For the democratization models, oil reserves and diamond production data were substi- None of these robustness checks meaningfully change the results for the key independent variables. During the decolonization period, choosing ethnic loyalty despite an unmatched officer corps remains statistically significant, in the same direction, and of the same magnitude. None of the additional control variables were significant in the decolonization models.
Likewise, with the democratization data, the category variable indicating an ethnic change in leadership combined with prior ethnic stacking remained statistically significant, positive, and of the same general magnitude across robustness checks. The majority of the control variables were insignificant including the military organization variables, raw civil liberty score, Polity measures, AU membership, ongoing civil war, and Herbst's difficult geography.
Alternative measures for prior coups, however, were statistically significant. Indeed, leaders seemed particularly vulnerable to military overthrow when a recent coup had led to the election that brought them to power. Lasting military reform is an ordeal that must be grappled with domestically. 
